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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CLEJONE B. COOPER, Executrix
and FIRSrr SECURITY BANK
OF UTAH, N.A., Administrator
\Vith ~Will Annexed of the Estate of
Joe W. Cooper, Deceased.
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
- vs. -

)

Case
No. 11097

DA VIS C. HOLDER, doing business
as HOLDER ENGINEERING
COMP ANY, and CITY OF MOAB,
a Municipal Corporation,
Def endant-Appella1nt.

Plaintiffs' ..Respondents' Brief
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case concerns a claim of plaintiffs-respondents,
as the personal representatives of the estate of an
a:o;signee of Davis C. Holder, a former contract engineer for the defendant-appellant City of Moab, for funds
paill on the contract by the City to Holder rather than
to the assignee.
1

DISPOSI'fION IN LO"WER COURT
'l'hr trial court eutered a judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs-respondents ai1d against the def endant-appellant City of Moab for the sum uf $6,714.15 and costs.
HELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-respoudents seek an affirmation of the decision of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs-respondents do not controvert the statement of facts set forth in appellant '8 brief except in one
particular. It is nut complPtely accurate to say, as does
appellant in its brief, that "No claim or attempt to satisfy the pro,'isions of Section 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which requires that a claim be presented to
the governing body as a condition precedent to maintaining an action against the City, has ever, at any time,
been preseuted to the City Council.'' It is conceded in
the Statement of 11-,acts in appellant's brief that plaintiffs did sufficiently call the assignment to the attention
of the City Council and City Recorder of the defendant
in December of 1962 that the defendant did honor the
assignment thereafter (appellant's brief, page 3).
Further, the following facts, in addition to those
set forth in appellant's briPf, are material to the consideration of this case:
On or about the 28th day of March, 1961, said Davis
C. Holder (herr~inafter sometimes referred to as "Hold2

er") entered into a written agreement with the defendant-appellant City of Moab (hereinafter called "City")
under which Holder was employed to render certain engineering services to City for a specified compensation
(plaintiffs' Exhibit 1; Pretrial Order Dated April 12,
rnfi5). Appellant does not contend that this agreement
~was not executed in all particulars so as to be binding
between the City and Holder.
On the 14th day of April, 1961, Holder assigned all
of his rights to compensation under plaintiffs' Exhibit
1 to a trustee for the benefit of Joseph W. Cooper, (hereinafter called "Cooper") of whose estate plaintiffs-respondents (hereinafter called "respondents") are the
pc>rsoual representatives (plaintiffs' Exhibit 3; Pretrial
Order dated April 12, 1965). Appellant does not contend that this assignment was not effective, as between
Holder and Cooper, to entitle Cooper to have all the
moneys earned by Holder under plaintiffs' Exhibit 1
paid to the designated assignee.
This assignment was acknowledged by Kenneth E.
McDonough, then Mayor of City, on April 14, 1961
(plaintiffs' Exhibit 3; Pretrial Order dated April 12,
1965). This acknowledgment reads as follows:
''I hereby acknowledge that the City of Moab,
Utah, has received a copy of the foregoing assignment and that payment under the above-mentioned contract shall be, made to William E. Foster, Attorney, Trustee, P. 0. Box 1598, Grand
Junction, Colorado, until written authorization or
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instructions to the contrary are received from
William E. Foster.
CITY OF l\IOAB
By K. E. McDouGALD, /s/
Mayor
DAVIS C. HoLDER /s/
Davis C. Holder, doing business
as Holder Engineering
Company.''
Appellant does not contend that the said l\[ayor did not
recein~ a copy of the assignment 11or that he was not
fully adYised of the same. On the other hand, respondents conce<1e that there iH uo cYidence to show that this
assignment and aclrnowlcllgmcnt >vas called to the attention of the Recorder or City Conllcil of City until December of 1962.
As st"t forth in page 3 of appelJant's brief, certain
smns of money were paid to Holder by City between
April 12, 1962, and Deccmhc1·, 1962. Appellant does not
assert that these payments wer0 11ot properly authorized
and paid by City or that Holder was not entitled to the
same. It follows that if CoopPr \ms entitled to lrnYe these
sums paid to Holder by City during this period paid to
the trustee under the assignm011t, plaintiffs are entitled
to the judgment re11derecl by the trial court.
ARGUl\IENT
POINT I
IN ANSWER TO POINT I OF APPELLANT'S
BRIEF IT IS NOT NJDCESSARY IN ORDER
TO BIND THE CITY TO HONOR THE ASSIGNMENT THAT THE REQUIREMENTS
4

FOR THE CREATION OF A NEW LIABILITY AGAINST CITY BE MET BTJT ONLY
THAT THE CITY RECEIVE NOTICE OF
THE ASSIGNMENT.
Appellant, in Point I of its brief, asserts that it
was not bound to honor the assignment in question because the Mayor did not have authority to create a financial obligation against the City without the concurrence
of the City Council. This contention assumes that the
ohligation of the City to give to an assignee of Holder
the performance which it was obligated to give Holder
is the creation of an additional liability over and above
that which ·was originally created in favor of Holder and
therefore the City was not bound to honor the assignment unless it agreed to do so.
Appellant does not contend that it did not have legal
liability to Holder and this issue was laid at rest when
Hohler was paid the sums of money due him under the
contract with the City.

It is the position of respondents that the City obviously had legal liability to Holder and that the assignment amounted to a direction or order on the part of
Holder to the City to pay to the assignee the sum of
money to which Holder was entitled. This approach on
the problem is more clearly set forth on page 4 of the
.l\frmorandum Decision of the Trial Judge, F. W. Keller,
dated October 3, 1967, as follows:
''As I analyze this case, the claim of the plaintiffs
arises out of the contract duly and regularly entered into between the City of Moab and the as-
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signor. Once that contract was rcg-ularly entered
into, all that the City of 1\loab was entitle<l to was
performancP on the part of the assignor. What
the assignor did respeding what he was entitled
to receive as compensation \Vas not a matter of
concern to the City as long as it had proper notice of the assignment.''
Respondents do not assert tliat the City was bound
to honor the assignment on the theory that the acknowledgment signed by the l\Iayor amounted to an agreement
on the part of the City to honor the assignment but rather
said acknowledgment amounted to notice to the City of
the assignment and that the City was hound irrespective
of whether or not it agreed to be bound.
"In the absence of a statute to the contrary, it is
generally held that an assignment becomes effective and valid on the mutual assent of the assignor and the assignee, and that, as between the
parties, no notice to the <lebtor is necessary, the
assignment opernting as a final and binding transfer of title, and such notice being necessary only
to charge the debtor with the duty of payment to
the assignee." 6 C.J.S., Assignments, Section 74,
pages 1124-1125.
"As a general rule, tlw c011sent or acceptance of
the debtor is not essential to the validity of an
assignment of an entire fund or chose in action
eith<>r as hetw0en the 1ia rties or as against the
debtor, and the debtor will not he permitted to
restrain such an assignment by its refusal to consent thereto.'' 6 C.J.S., Assignments, Section 75,
Page 1127.
This principlP- that thP- agreement of the debtor is
not necessary to obligate him to give the performance to
6

the assignee is illustrated by the case of Matson v.
White, 122 Colo. 79, 220 P. 2d 864, 1950, wherein the
assignor had an agreement with the defendant to the
pffoct that the defendant was to furnish household water
to the property of the assignor. The assignor assigned
his interest in this contract to the plaintiffs who brought
Ruit to require the defendants to furnish them the water
in accordance with the terms of the contract. The Supreme Court of Colorado held, against the contention of
the defendants that the assignment was not binding
upon them, that the assignment was valid even though
the defendants did not consent thereto and that the defendants were obligated to give to the plaintiffs the perfornrnnce to which the assignors were originally entitled
m1der the agreement.
This general rule that the consent of the debtor is
not essential to obligate him to honor the assignment is
also applicable where the debtor is a municipal corporation and the moneys due under the contract are assigned.
Pe(Jple's Bank v. Attala County, 156 Miss. 560, 126 So.
192, 1930; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Village
of Milan, 176 F. Supp. 84, District Court of Illinois, 1959.
The principle that there is an important distinction
between the creation of a new liability and a transfer of
an existing liability to an assignee is clearly set
forth in the case of Bank of Spring City v. Rhea
County, Tenn. 59 S.W. 442, 1900, wherein notice of an
assignment was given to McPherson, one of the Commissioners of the debtor County and also Secretary of
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the Boanl of ( '.ommiss1011ers. The Tennessee Court said
the follnwi11g in 1Joi11ti11g up the cliffereHce l>ehn~e11 •' ac('eptmwt:~'' a11cl ''notiee '':
"\Ve do 11ot think that the ('Omplaintants are entitled to re('OYer on this order hy Yirtue of the aceeptnnce, so called, made hy Mr. :McPherson.
While, urn1n the authority of the case of Smith
Y. HnLbard, \\·e have hold that notice to one commissioner was 1101 ice to all, yet this is not tantamount to saying that one commissioner could
make a coutract of aceeptance for the county, and
thus lay the county open to suit on such acceptance'. As affecting the rights of the parties in this
case, the point is not material, inasmuch as \Ye
haYe just adjudged that the connty was liable on
the gronncls of the as::;ignment. There is a difference in principle, howeYer, between a liability
createcl hy assignment and notice and one created
by an acceptance. The reqniRites of the first are
an existing liability to the assignor, and assignment of that liability to the assignee, and notice
to the debtor. The requisites of the second are
simply an 01«ler and an acceptance. There may· or
not he originally any indebtedness due by the acceptor to the clrawor. The consideration of an
acceptance nrny a rise out of such incle btedness
existing hPtween the clrawer and acceptor, or eYen
without suel1 irnlehte(lness where the acceptance
is recPi,·erl liy the clrm,·ee in payment of a debt
dne to him from the drawer. It may well be held
that notice may he given to one commissioner for
all, but it would not follow that one commissioner
could make a contract for all."
That the important thing- is the notice to the debtor
is stated as follow::; in 6 C..J.S. Assignments, Section 100,
page 1156:

8

"If he (the assignee) wishes to secure himself as
aFSainst intervening rights and equities, however
it is essential that the assignee give notice of th~
assignment to the debtor, for it is almost uniformly held that, insofar as may be necessary to give
the debtor the benefit of intervening defenses or
equity or protect him against being compelled to
pay the debt twice or prejudice resulting from
acts taken in ignorance of the assignment, it will
not be effective against him until he has been notified thereof."
If Cooper had presented the assignment in question
to the City Council and/or the City Recorder it seems
obvious that it would not have mattered whether or not
the Recorder and/or City Council agreed to accept and
l1onor the assignment but rather the City would have
lwen bound, irrespective of any action on its part, to
honor the assignment, because this would clearly have
heen notice to the City. The crucial question is not
whrther or not the City agreed to, consented to, or aceeptrd the assignment, but whether or not it had no.tice
of the same. Since this is the vital issue, the authoritif~s, statutes and cases cited by appellant in Point I of
its argument, all of which deal with the authority of the
l\layor to make contracts for and create liability of the
City by his act, are immaterial to the basic issue in this
ease.
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POINT II
THE NOTICE GIVEN TO THE MAYOR OF
11 HE Cl'l'Y CH' l\fOAB IN THIS CASE \VAS
NOTICE~ TO THE CITY -WHICH \VAS SUFFICIENT TO REQUIRE THE CITY TO HONOR
THE ASSIGNMENT.
It is evident that the 2\layor of the City of J\Ioab,
based upon the acknowledgment signed by him (plaintiffs' exhibit 3), had full and complete notice of the
assignnwnt. The question then resolves itself as to
·whether or not the notice to the J\Iayor would be considered and deemed to be notice to the City.
In Bank of Spri11g City Y. Rhea County, supra, the
Court said the following in response to the contention
that the notice of the assignment giYen to one of the
commissioners who was also secretary of the board of
commiRsioners (Jf the county waR not notice to the board
itself or to the County:
''As to the first point. 'l'his seems to be settled
against the County in the case of Smith v. Hubbard, 85 Tenn. 306, 2:3 S.W. 36!=!. In that case it
appeared that the conuty court of Smith County
appointed seYeral commissioners to contract for
thP erection of a bridge. A written contract was
ent<~recl into hy them with King & Son, and by the
latter was assig11ed to B.l<'.C. Smith. A portion of
thP clcbt was paid by the defendants, but afterwards the County refosed to pay the balance. The
Circuit .Judge madP a finding of law and facts.
The error relied upon hy the plaintiff in the Supreme Court was an expr0Rs finding by the circuit jwlge . . . S<'COll<_], that before the plaintiff
could r<'<'<>Yer of the defrmlaiits the price for the
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huilding of the bridge, he was required to notify
at least two of the three commissioners that he
was entitled to receive the money, and get them
to accept the order. The circuit judge found that
such notice was not given until after $250 had
heen paid by the county to the assignor, and
though after transfer and assignment to the plaintiff, ·was a good payment, and a credit on the
amount due under the instrument. The court said
'-we a re of the opinion that this finding contains
two distinct errors.' The two errors pointed out
in the opinion were that the circuit judge erroneously found the instrument was not negotiable,
and that he held that it was necessary to notify
at least two of the three commissioners. The Court
said that while the instrument was not strictly
negotiable, it was assignable under the statute,
and suit might be brought by the assignee in his
own name, and hence that notice was not necessary. The court continued: 'But, if notice had
been necessary, we think that notice to one of its
commissioners would have been notice to all, and
that notice to two would have been better, as a
matter of law, than notice to all.' ... This case
settles the point that notice need be given to only
one of the commissioners. Now, in the case before
the Court it appears that Mr. McPherson was one
of the commissioners. Notice to him was therefore, notice to the whole body of commissioners."
In Thayer v. Lyman, 35 Vt. 644, 1863, the Supreme

Court of Vermont said:
''The plaintiff sued the principal debtor, and summoned the town of Woodford as trustee upon two
tow11 orders. Both had been assigned by the principal debtor. As to the order B, the a_ssigned gave
due notice to the selectmen (that is to two of
them), but gave no notice to the town treasurer
11

of the aso-;ig11m( nt before ihe service of the trustee
proecss. 'l111e plaintiff claims, that notice of the
a.sRignmc·nt must he given to the town treasurer
on whom the orderR wc>re rlrawn and by \d1om they
were to he paid, and that notice to the selectmen
is not enongh. But we think notice of the assignment, 0itlwr to the selectmen or to the treasurer
is good aud sufficient to protect the right of the
assignee against the trustee process.''
1

Jn Burditt v. Porfrr, G::l Vt. 296, 21 Atl. 935, 1891, it
was contended that noti«e given to the chairman of the
board of :t],-e selectmen was insufficient to make the as~ignme11t valid against a garnio-;hment Rubsequently
served 011 the board. 'J'he Supreme Court of Vermont
referred to Thayer v. J,ymau, o-;nyJTa, and affirmed its decision tlierein. r.l1 l1e Court said fort her:
"\,Vhile one selectman cannot, without the concurrence of a majorit~- of the eboard, bind his
town by his contract, we see no valid reason that
notire of the assignment of a debt against a town
must be gi vPn to a majority of the selectmen. Notice to one of them is, in legal effect, notice to all,
and to the corporation for which they act. The
selectmen are by statute made the financial agents
of the town, and charged with the general supervision of its affairs. '\Vlien a notice affecting the
town's liability is ginu to a member of the board
it is given for the town, and it becomes the duty
of a member of tlie hoard to communicate the notice to his associates. It is \vell settled that notice
to an agent of the party, whose duty it is as such
agent to act upon the notice, or to communicate
his information to hiR principal in the proper discharge of his trust aR such agent, is legal notice
to his principal. rrhe principal is deemed to have
notice of whatever is communicated to his agent
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while acting as such in the transaction to which
the communication related .... A town can receive
notic.e only through its officers or other agents,
and it therefore becomes the duty of the agent to
communicate the notice received by him to the
persons who may be called upon to act with reference thereto.''
Kaeser v. Teien of Starksboro, 116 Vt. 389, 77 A.2d
831, 1951, states the following:

"When a notice affecting the town's liability is
given to a member of the board of selectmen, it is
given for the town, and it becomes the duty of the
member notified to communicate the notice of his
associates."
Ree also Douglass & Varnum v. Village of Morrisi:ille, 89
Vt. 393, 95 Atl. 810, 1915.

In Sintes v. Commerford, 112 La. 706, 36 So. 656,
1904, the notice of the assignment ·was served upon the
C'omptroller of the City of Nev;r Orleans. The Supreme
Court of Louisiana, in holding that this notice bound the
City, also inf erred that service on the ::\Iayor also would
lie sufficient as follows:
"As to the notice of the assignment, whilst it is,
no doubt, true that legal process should be served
on the mayor or other officer designated by the
Charter of a municipal corporation, we can perceive no sufficient reason why such corporation,
as a matter of convenience to itself, may not designate a particular officer to .receive notices .of
assignments of salaries and claims ... Any notice
to the debtor is sufficient.''
Nf~\'Cral other decisions hold that notice to the comptroller is notice to the City. Third Nat. Bank of City of
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Philadelphia v. Atlantic City, 130 FeJ. 731, 1904; Dickerson v. City of Spokane, 26 Wash. 292, 66 Pac. 381, 1901.

In City 1Vat. Hauk Y. Friedman, 187 Ark. 854, 62 S.W.
2d 28, 1933, the issue' was whether or not notice filed with
the Secretary of the commisRion of a paving district was
binding on the cfoit rict. rrhe Supreme Court of Arkansas,
in answering in the affirmative, said:
"Here it is undisputed that the orders were filed
with the Secretary of the commission and this
served to give it notice of the assignment of the
refund to Friedman, whether the individual commissioners were actually informed of this or not.
The only reason for giving any notice of an assignment of a debt to the debtor is to direct him
to whom it should be paid and thus protect him
from any snbRequent claim by the assignor.''
In Bell v. Board of Commissioners of Lake County,
26 Colo. App. 192, 141 Pac. 861, 1914, verbal notice of the
assignment was given to the ('hairman of the board of
county commission0rs and also the county attorney. The
Colorado Court held that the County had notice and
said:
"The contention seems to be made that because
this information was not given in writing or communicated to the board while the members thereof
were assembled as a board, it is not notice to the
County. This contention, we think, is untenable.
It is opposed to the doctrine of agency and the
effect of information coming to agents as applied
to individuals and corporations."
"While it is true that the board of county commisf'ionern is the designated agent of the county,
it is likewise true that the board ('annot hear ex14

cept through the ears of the individual members
con.stituting the board, not see except through
their eyes; that each of said members, while acting for the county, is an agent thereof, in a limited _sense, to the extent, at least, that information
commg to each member while acting for the County may, for such purposes as are herein under
consideration, be charged as notice to the county. Such seems to be the uniform holding of the
courts as to notice coming to the officials of a
municipality of defects in its streets and other
matters while in the course of their employment ... , and even though such notice come to
the officials or agents while traveling the streets
as private citizens."
rrhe holding of Bell v. Board of Commissioners of
Lake County, supra, was affirmed in School District No .
.'J \'. Central Savings Bank & Trust Co., 113 Colo. 487, 159
P. 2d 361, 1945, where the facts are, in many respects,
similar to the facts in the instant case. The Supreme
Court of Colorado held that notice of the assignment
given to the secretary of the defendant school district
and later to the president was notice to the school district
'd1ich was liable to the assignee for payment made to the
assignor after it had notice of the assignment.
From the foregoing cases it would seem that the following principles are applicable to the problem at hand,
to-wit:
1. Notice given to any one member of the governing board of a municipal corporation is notice to the corporation itself. Bank of Spring City v. Rhea County,
:·nipra; Thayer v. Lyman, supra; Burditt v. Porter, supra;
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8infcs v. Co11111u,rforr7, supra; Hell v. Board of Commis-

swncrs,

~npra.

2. ri1 hi,'; is trnc PYC'll m a stronger sense ·where the
member of the gon'rning hoard to whom the notice is

given is the clti0f cxceutiYe or presicfo1g officer of the
board. Burditt \'. Porter, snpra; ,','i11tcs v. Commerford,
supra; Bell v. Boarrl uf (!ornmissioncrs, supra; School
flistrir:t No. 3 v. Central Sarings Bank and Trust Co.,
supra.
:). Notice given to officers other than those serving
on the governing ])oanl has bce11 npheld to be sufficient.
Ba11k of 81Jri11g City v. Rhea County, supra; School D·istrict No. 8 v. Central 8arings and Trust Co., supra, (Secretary); Thayer v. Lyma11, supra ('l'rcasurer); Sintes v.
Co111mcrford, supra, Third Nat. Ballk v. Atlantic City,
supra, and Dickerson v. City nf 81JOkanc, supra, (Comptroller); Bell v. Board of Com111issio11ers, supra (Attorney).
4. The notice need not be iu writing nor in any particular form. Bf'll v. Hoard uf Cmnmissioners, supra.
5. The notice Heed not be i.;i \'en at a meeting of governing hoard. Bell \'. Board of Commissioners, supra.
6. One of the hasic reasons for the foregoing principles is that a mrn1her of il10 goycn1ing hoard or one of
its offieers has n duty to l'<Hnrnunicate to the board the
information Jiu l1as affecti11g tlw liability of the municipal corporation. Kaeser v. Town of ,S'tarksboro, supra;
City of A berdccu v. !Jank of A 11wr,11, Ell J\Iiss. 318, 2 So.
2d 1.J:3, 1941; B111rlitt \'. J>nrfer, snpni.
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It is worthy of note that in all of the cases involving
tlii 8 issue which respondents' counsel has been able to
fincl, the courts held the notice to be sufficient to bind
the pnhlic body. In no case was the notice determined to
be immfficien t.

1t is apparent from the foregoing that if this Court
is to follow the decisions made in other states it must find
tliat the City of Moab had notice of the assignment in
cpwstion. An examination of the Utah Statutes and
HnlcH of Procedure further strengthens this conclusion.
Section 10-4-23, Utah Code Ann., 1953, reads in part
as follows:
''The chief executive of cities of the third class
shall be the mayor .... "
Section 10-6-24, Utah Code Ann. 1953, provides,
among other things, as follovrs:
''He (the mayor of third class cities) shall from
time to time give the council information concerning the affairs of the city ... "
'L'he ::\Iayor, as the chief executive officer of the city
obligated hy law to keep the city council advised, is the
logical person on 'Shorn any notice to the city would be
st-rYed. It would be difficult to imagine any other municipal officer who could better be given notice on behalf of
the city.
Rule 4 ( e) ( 5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
wliieh provides that personal service of process within
tlit> Ntate shall be made "upon an incorporated city, by
(ldi vrring a copy thereof to the mayor or recorder .... "
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Under this rule if a summons were Jelivered to the
mayor the Court would have jurisdiction to enter a judgment against the eity irrespective of whether or not the
mayor advised the city com1cil or other officer of the
city of the service of the process. In other words, our
i·ulcs contemplate that a city is bound by notice given to
the city of a legal action by the delivery of the summons
to the mayor. Certainly this same principle applies to
notice of an assignment particularly when one considers
that the cases from other jurisdictions are less exacting
in their requirements as to notice of an assignment than
they are as to the service of legal process.
The underlying problem in the present case is that
"\Ye have, in effoct, a contest between two parties who
are not at fault in a general moral sense and this Court
must assess the loss against one or the other. The City
Council did not know of the assignment when it paid
Holder. On the other hand Cooper (the assignee) had
every reason to believe that the Mayor of City would
perform his legal duty to communicate the notice to the
City Council and that he need do nothing further to
notify City. The question then becomes one of determining which of the parties must bear the responsibility
for this breach of duty on the part of the Mayor. Respondents submit that the l\Iayor is the agent of the City
and that the City must bear the loss suffered in this
situation by the respondents (and their predecessor)
who had no relationship with the Mayor.
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City of Aberdeen v. Bank of Amory, 191 Miss. 318, 2
So. 2d 153, 1941, presents a fact situation similar to the
present case. The facts are stated by the court as follows:

''Crosby and Sherman were employed hy the City
to do necessary engineering services required in
the construction of a municipal airport wherein
the City agreed to pay them the sum of $200.00
for a preliminary survey and assistance in securing the approval of the project by their Works
Progress Administration, and in addition 5% of
the funds for their supervision services. Crosby
and Sherman secured a loan from the Bank in the
sum of $3,000.00 for which they gave their note.
To secure this note, they transferred and assigned
in writing to the bank their contract with the City
in which they directed the City to pay any
amounts due or to become due them under their
contract to the Bank ... The assignment to the
Bank was dated May 20th, 1936. It was filed with
the City Clerk. ... After receiving the notice the
city paid Crosby and Sherman the amount for
which judgment was rendered, $198.30."
The City sought to reverse the judgment upon the
grounds ''that the filing of the assignment with the City
clerk was not legal notice to the city.'' The Supreme
Court of l\Iississippi rejected this contention and said:
"Under these principles this court notes that the
municipal clerk is not only its clerical officer but
is the custodian of all its books, records and papers. Part of his duties is to keep the governing
officers of the municipality informed as to such
records and papers. We are of the opinion tha.t
the filing of the assignment with the city clerk
was notice to the governing authorities of the
municipality.''
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The reaso11s for tli0 decision i11 the ease last above
referred to apply ·with en'n stronger force where the notice is gi1'e11 to 11H• mayor who is the chief executive of
the city aml 111(' rliief go1·el'lling officer. If notice to the
rity de1·k is notice to the eity on the theory that he is
bound to co1ffPY the 110ticc to the governing authorities certuinly notice to thP chiPf executive and governing
officer of the city must lw notice to the city.

It follows from th<' foregoing that the City of Moah
had notice of the assignm0nt and as a consequence thereof was bound to hoIJor said assignm0nt, which it did not
do, and respondents are entitled to the judgment against
the City awaI"derl hy the trial court.

POINT III
IN ANSvVER TO APPELLANT'S POINT II,
SINCE THFJ OBLIGA '11 ION OF THE CITY TO
PAY THE ASSIGNEE UNDER THE ASSIGN1\lEN'l' vV.AS NO'l' ri1 HE CREATION OF A
NJ1JW CON'l1 RACT BUT RATHER THE
TRANSFER OF THEJ RIGHT OF PERFORMANCE UNDER AN EXISTING CONTRACT,
THE SIGNA'rURE OF THFJ CITY RECORDER TS NOT REQUIRED.
It follows from what lurn heretofore been said in this
brief that the o hlig·a ti on of the City to the assignee
umler the assignmf'nt was not the making of a new contract hut rather the' tra11.sfl.r of Uw right to performance
of a colltract which was admittedly valid and executed in
all partienlars as reqnircJ h? the statutes applicable
thereto.
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rri1e City Recorder could not prevent the valid transfer of tlu· right of Holder to compensation from the City
lo tl1c Assignee by refusing to sign or acknowledge the
assignment. Therefore, the statute requiring the City
Hc·corder to countersign all contracts made in behalf of
the City (Section 10-10-61, Utah Code Annotated, 1953)
is inapplicable to the assignment. Likewise the cases
ei\C'(l by appellant under Point II of the brief are not
relevallt to the issue before the Court.

POINT IV
IN ANSvVER TO POINT III IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF, SECTION 10-7-77, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT CASE.

1t might very well be argued that there was a presc·nta tiou of claim by the plaintiffs as required by Section
J0-7-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, from the fact admitted in appellant's brief that in December of 1962 the
Cit:-, ( 'ou11cil ancl City Recorder were notified of the assigmnent and thereafter payments were made to the
n:-;:-:igHec and that this was within one year" after the last
item of such account or claim accrued" on the theory
that the contract between Holder and City was actually
011e daim and that the limitation of one year provided
hy 8Pction 10-7-77, \vould not start to run until after
Holc1Pr was entitled to the last moneys under that
contract.

Ii is the primary contention of respondents that the
following language in Section 10-7-77, Utah Code AnnotatPcl, HJ53:
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''Every claim, other than claims above mentioned, against any city or town must be presented, properly itemized or described and verified as to correctness by the claimant or his agent,
to the governing body within one year after the
last item of such account or claim accrued, and if
such account or claim is not properly or sufficiently itemized or described or verified, the governing
body may require the same to he made more specific as to itemization or description, or to be corrected as to the verification thereof.''
was satisfied in this case when the contract between
Holder and City \vas approved by the City Council and
Recorder of the City, when statements were submitted
to the City for payment to Holder for work done, and
the same were paid. The City did make the payments to
Holder and does not contend that Holder did not have a
valid claim against the City and was not entitled to payment. This identical claim was transferred to the Assignee. The right of the assignee was not based on a new
claim but on the ownership of the Holder claim. The only
question is whether or not the City had notice of the
assignment so as to obligate it to make payment on the
claim of Holder to the assignee in the assignment.
Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P. 2d 882,
1947, involved an action against Salt Lake City for the
wrongful taking of water after an eminent domain proceeding was commended and later dismissed. The majority of the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court
awarding damages and did not discuss the question of
the failure of the plaintiff to present his claim under the
statute in question. Justice -Wolfe, in his dissenting
opinion, agreed with the majority of the Court as to the
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right of the plaintiffs to recover, but disagreed as to the
measure of damages. Justice Wolfe said the following
with reference to the presentation of the claim question:
'' rt'he second proposition: I think it well to mention that the city urges as a bar to this action
Section 15-7-76, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933
' the'
now same section U.C.A. 1943. It urges that
plaintiffs did not file their claim with the city
until April 17, 1939, though the condemnation
suit was dismissed on January 7, 1938, and therefore the claim was not filed within one year after
the cause of action a.rose as is required by the
cited statute. It is my opinion that Section 15-7-76
has no application to the claim here involved as
to damages for deprivation of the use of the water right from the date of the court order to the
date of the dismissal of the condemnation suit by
the City. The purpose of 15-7-76 was so that the
eity would be apprised of the details of any ordinary claims in order that agents of the city could
timely and promptly look after the city's interest
in securing evidence, etc., to def end any subsequent suits or as a. basis for settlement. In the
case at bar the city started condemnation proceedings. The agents of the city were fully apprised
of what it was trying to take from the Moyles and
in such situation I think no presentation of claim
is required. The ordinary statutes of limitations
govern.''
Counsel for the respondents has been unable to find
only one Utah case dealing with an assignment of moneys
under a contract with a city. This case is Salt Lake City
v. O'Con1110r, 68 Utah 233, 249 Pac. 810, 1926, which
deals with the question as to priority of claims (to
mom•ys due the contractor from the city) between
<l hank who was an assignee of the contractor and
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the snrety company who furuished the bond to the
contractor who alf.m had an assignment from the
coutractor ms part of the application for the bond.
The opinion recites that the bank gave notice of
its assignment to the City but makes no mention as to
whetlwr or not a claim \\'HS presented in the formal manner rec1uinxl by Section 10-7-77. The Court held that the
claim of the surety was superior. The fact that it did not
discuss Section 10-7-77 indicates that the Court did no!
feel that was pertinent to the case and essential to the
rnlidity of the <'laim of either assignee against the City.
The cases cited by appellant in support of its Point
III do not deal with the question here presented as to
whether or not an assignee of a valid claim against a
city which has bee11 approved hy the city when presented
hy the assignor must file the claim a second time under
Section 10-7-77. Respondents contend that this must be
Ea1swcrecl in the rn•gatin and that the only thing that
would be required is that the city be given notice of the
assignment in onlcr that the city could make payment
to the proper person. The above quoted language from
Moyle v. Salt Lake City, supra, suggests two reasons
'Why Section 10-7-77 does not apply to the case at hand.
:B'irst, if tlw eity has adual notice of the claim there is no
need for presentation. Second, since the purpose of the
statute is to gi\·e tlw city an opportunity to determine
,,-lteth!::'r the claim is valid or invalid, it has 110 application
where, as h('l"<', tl1c• claim is valid and was presented by
Holder arnl HilJll'<J\'C<l hy the City Council 80 that the
r1uestio11 is not \\'hethn the claim is valid but to determine to wltum pa .nrn~ll t 011 t lw claim :.,;houl<l be made.
24

CONCLUSION
The claim of the respondents against the City of
f\Ioab is not based upon an agreement on the part of the
City to pay the assignee named in the assignment but
rather is based upon the transfer of the existing liability
whieh the City had to Davis C. Holder. This being the
case, the issue is not whether the Mayor of the City could
"billd" the City but rather whether or not the notice
given to the Mayor was notice given to the City. It follows from the fact that the respondents do not rely on a
contract made between the assignee and the City but
rather on the assignment of an admittedly valid contract
aud claim between the City and Holder the requirements
of ihe Utah Statutes relative to contracts executed by
the City are inapplicable. Respondents further contend
that its position as an assignee of a valid claim against
the City does not require that its assignment be presented as a separate claim to the City in accordance with
Section 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Since the
sole issue is whether or not the City had notice of the
aHsignment and the authorities cited in this brief support the proposition that notice to the Mayor was notice
to the City, the judgment of the trial court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
L. ROBERT ANDERSON
P. 0. Box 1057
Monticello, Utah 84535
Attorney for
Plain.tiffs-Respondents
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